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Abstract. Lossy trapdoor functions enable black-box construction of
public key encryption (PKE) schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext
attack [18]. Recently, a more eﬃcient black-box construction of public
key encryption was given in [12] with the help of chameleon all-but-one
trapdoor functions (ABO-TDFs).
In this paper, we propose a black-box construction for transforming
any ABO-TDFs into chameleon ABO-TDFs with the help of chameleon
hash functions. Instantiating the proposed general black-box construc-
tion of chameleon ABO-TDFs, we can obtain the ﬁrst chameleon ABO-
TDFs based on the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
Keywords: Lossy Trapdoor Functions, Chameleon All-But-One
Trapdoor Functions, Chameleon Hash Functions.
1 Introduction
Lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) were ﬁrst introduced by Peikert and Waters
[18] and further studied in [6,7,8,9,19,14]. LTDFs imply lots of fundamental
cryptographic primitives, such as collision-resistant hash functions [18], oblivious
transfer [17]. LTDFs can be used to construct many cryptographic schemes,
such as deterministic public-key encryption [2], encryption and commitments
secure against selective opening attacks [1], non-interactive string commitments
[16]. Most important of all, LTDFs enable black-box construction of public key
encryption (PKE) schemes secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA-secure
PKE in short) [18].
A lossy trapdoor function is a public function f which works in two compu-
tationally indistinguishable modes, i.e., there is no eﬃcient adversary who can
tell which working mode f is in, given only the function description. In the ﬁrst
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mode, it behaves like an injective trapdoor function and the input x can be re-
covered from f(x) with the help of a trapdoor. In the second mode, f turns into
a many-to-one function and it loses a signiﬁcant amount of information about
the input x. Hence, f in the latter mode is called a lossy function.
LTDFs were further extended to a richer abstraction called all-but-one trap-
door functions (ABO-TDFs), which can be constructed from LTDFs [18]. A
collection of ABO-TDFs is associated with a branch set B, and an ABO trap-
door function gb(·) is uniquely determined by a function index g and a branch
b ∈ B. There exists a unique branch b∗ ∈ B such that gb∗(·) is a lossy func-
tion, while all gb(·), b = b∗, are injective ones. However, the lossy branch b∗
is computationally hidden by description of the function g. Freeman et al. [6]
generalized the deﬁnition of ABO trapdoor functions by allowing possibly many
lossy branches instead of one. Let B∗ be the set of lossy branches. Then, an ABO
trapdoor function gb(·) is injective if b ∈ B∗ and lossy if b ∈ B \ B∗.
The black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE from LTDFs in [18] needs a
collection of LTDFs, a collection of ABO-TDFs, a pair-wise independent family
of hash functions, and a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme, where
the set of veriﬁcation keys is a subset of the branch set of the ABO collection.
The black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE from LTDFs was further im-
proved in [12]. The improved construction is free of the strongly unforgeable
one-time signature scheme, and employs a collision-resistant hash function in-
stead. This results in ciphertexts of shorter length and encryption/decryption
of greater eﬃciency. The price is that the collection of ABO-TDFs is replaced
by a special kind of ABO-TDFs, namely chameleon ABO-TDFs. The notion of
chameleon ABO-TDFs was ﬁrst proposed in [12]. Chameleon ABO-TDFs behave
just like ABO-TDFs except the following speciﬁc properties. Chameleon ABO-
TDFs have two variables (u, v) to represent a branch. The chameleon property
requires that given any half branch u, there exists an eﬃcient algorithm to com-
pute the other half branch v with a trapdoor such that (u, v) is a lossy branch.
Lai et al. [12] proposed a general construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs based
on any CPA-secure homomorphic PKE scheme with some additional property,
like the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme [5]. This paper will further explore
a more general construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs, which combines ABO-
TDFs with chameleon hash functions.
1.1 Related Works
Since this paper focuses on the general construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs,
we review here the existing constructions of LTDFs in the literature.
Peikert and Waters [18] showed how to construct LTDFs and ABO-TDFs
based on the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) assumption and the worst-case
hardness of lattice problem. Freeman et al. [6] presented LTDFs and ABO-TDFs
based on the Quadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption, the Decisional Composite
Residuosity (DCR) assumption and the d-Linear assumption. Hemenway and Os-
trovsky [7] showed that smooth homomorphic hash proof systems imply LTDFs,
and homomorphic encryption over cyclic groups also imply LTDFs [8]. Kiltz
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et al. [10] showed that the RSA trapdoor function is lossy under the φ-Hiding
assumption of Cachin et al. [4]. Recently, Boyen and Waters [3] proposed two
new discrete-log-type LTDFs based on the Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman
(DBDH) assumption.
Rosen and Segev [19] showed that any collection of injective trapdoor func-
tions that is secure under very natural correlated products can be used to con-
struct a CCA-secure PKE scheme, and demonstrated that any collection of
LTDFs with suﬃcient lossiness yields a collection of injective trapdoor functions
that is secure under natural correlated products.
Mol and Yilek [14] extended the results of [18] and [19] and showed that
only a non-negligible fraction of a single bit of lossiness is suﬃcient for building
CCA-secure PKE schemes.
Recently, Kiltz et al. [9] introduced the notion of adaptive trapdoor functions
(ATDFs) and tag-based adaptive trapdoor functions (TB-ATDFs). They showed
that ATDFs and TB-ATDFs can be constructed directly by combining LTDFs
and ABO-TDFs.
Lai et al. [12] introduced the notion of chameleon ABO-TDFs, presented a
construction using CPA-secure homomorphic PKE schemes with some additional
property and instantiated it with the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme [5].
Our work is also related to chameleon hash functions, which are randomized
collision-resistant hash functions with the additional property that given a trap-
door, one can eﬃciently generate collisions. Chameleon hash functions found
various applications in chameleon signatures [11], online/oﬄine signatures [20],
transformations for strongly unforgeable signatures [21], etc. Recently, Mohassel
presented a general construction of one-time signatures from chameleon hash
functions [13].
1.2 Our Contribution
We propose a black-box construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs by combining
chameleon hash functions with ABO-TDFs with the help of a collision-resistant
hash function family [15]. Let Y be the range of a collection of chameleon ABO-
TDFs and B be the branch set of a collection of ABO-TDFs. With the help
of a family T of collision-resistant hash functions from Y to B, a collection of
chameleon hash functions can be integrated into a collection of ABO-TDFs to
result in a collection of chameleon ABO-TDFs.
Following our black-box construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs, we can obtain
the ﬁrst chameleon ABO-TDFs based on the DDH assumption, which is the
integration of the DL-based chameleon hash function [11] proposed by Krawczyk
and Rabin and the ABO-TDFs [6] based on the DDH assumption.
1.3 Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the notion of chameleon
hash functions. In Section 3, we review the notion of chameleon ABO-TDFs. In
Section 4, we present a black-box construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs by
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combining any chameleon hash function with ABO-TDFs with the help of a
collision-resistant hash function family. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
1.4 Notation
Let H denote a set, |H| denote the cardinality of the set H, and h $←− H de-
note sampling uniformly from the uniform distribution on set H. If A(·) is an
algorithm, then a $←− A(·) denotes running the algorithm and obtaining a as
an output, which is distributed according to the internal randomness of A(·).
A function f(λ) is negligible if for every c > 0 there exists an λc such that
f(λ) < 1/λc for all λ > λc.
2 Chameleon Hash Functions
A family of chameleon hash functions is a set of randomized collision-resistant
(CR) hash functions with an additional property that one can eﬃciently generate
collisions with the help of a trapdoor.
Let H be a set of hash functions, with each function mapping X to Y.
Let k $←− Hindex(1κ) denote the index generation algorithm. Each index k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , |H|} determines a hash function Hk ∈ H. Then, H is collision-resistant
if for any polynomial-time adversary A, its advantage AdvCRH,A(1κ), deﬁned as
AdvCRH,A(1
κ) = Pr
[
Hk(x1) = Hk(x2) : k
$←− Hindex(1κ);x1, x2 $←− A(Hk)
]
,
is negligible.
A family H of chameleon hash functions [13], mapping U × V to Y con-
sists of three (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms: the index generat-
ing algorithm, the evaluation algorithm and the inversion algorithm, satisfying
chameleon, uniformity and collision resistance properties.
Index Generation Hgen(1κ): On input a security parameter 1κ, the key gen-
eration algorithm outputs an index k of H and a trapdoor td. The index k
determines a speciﬁc hash function Hk : U × V → Y.
Evaluation Hk(u, v): Each hash function Hk ∈ H, takes u ∈ U and v ∈ V as
inputs, and outputs a hash value in Y.
Inversion H−1k (u, v, td, u
′): On input (u, v) ∈ U × V , the trapdoor td and u′ ∈
U , where (k, td) $←− Hgen(1κ), the algorithm H−1k outputs v′ ∈ V .
Chameleon Property: Given a hash input (u, v) of Hk, the trapdoor td of
Hk, and u′ ∈ U , the algorithm H−1k computes v′ ∈ V such that Hk(u, v) =
Hk(u′, v′). More precisely,
Pr[Hk(u, v) = Hk(u′, v′) :(k, td)
$←− Hgen(1κ), u, u′ ∈ U ,
v ∈ V , v′ $←− H−1k (u, v, td, u′)] = 1.
(1)
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Uniformity Property: There exists a distribution Dv over V , such that for
all u ∈ U , the distributions (k,Hk(u, v)) and (k, b) are computationally in-
distinguishable, where (k, td) $←− Hgen(1κ), v is chosen from V according to
distribution Dv, and b $←− Y.
Collision Resistance Property: For all Hk ∈ H, without the knowledge of
the corresponding trapdoor, it is hard to ﬁnd a collision, i.e., it is hard to com-
pute two diﬀerent pairs (u, v) and (u′, v′) such that Hk(u, v) = Hk(u′, v′).
More precisely, for any polynomial-time adversaryA, its advantageAdvCRA,H(1κ),
deﬁned as
AdvCRA,H(1
κ) = Pr[Hk(u, v) = Hk(u′, v′) : (k, td)
$←− Hgen(1κ);
(u, v, u′, v′) $←− A(Hk)],
is negligible.
We generalize the deﬁnition of chameleon hash functions by allowing that Eq.(1)
holds with overwhelming probability. Then, H is called a family of almost-always
chameleon hash functions.
3 Chameleon ABO-TDFs
Chameleon ABO-TDFs is a speciﬁc kind of ABO-TDFs with two variable (u, v)
as a branch [12]. The chameleon property requires that given any u, it is easy to
compute a unique lossy branch (u, v) with the help of a trapdoor. The security re-
quires that without the trapdoor, any lossy branch (u, v0) and any branch (u, v1)
from the injective branch set are computationally indistinguishable. Meanwhile,
given a lossy branch (u, v), it is impossible to generate another lossy branch
(u′, v′) without the trapdoor.
Let U × V = {Uκ × Vκ}κ∈N be a collection of sets whose elements represent
the branches.
Definition 4 (Chameleon All-But-One Trapdoor Functions). A collection of
(n, k)-chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions is a 4-tuple of (possibly proba-
bilistic) polynomial-time algorithms (Gch,Fch,F−1ch ,CLBch) such that:
1. Sampling a Function: For any κ ∈ N, Gch(1κ) outputs (i, td, S) where i
is a function index, td is the trapdoor and S ⊂ Uκ × Vκ is a set of lossy
branches. Hereafter we will use U × V instead of Uκ × Vκ for simplicity.
2. Evaluation of Injective Functions: For any (u, v) ∈ U × V , if (u, v) /∈ S,
where (i, td, S) ← Gch(1κ), then Fch(i, u, v, ·) computes a (deterministic) in-
jective function gi,u,v(·) over the domain {0, 1}n, and F−1ch (i, u, v, td, ·) com-
putes g−1i,u,v(·).
3. Evaluation of Lossy Functions: For any (u, v) ∈ U×V , if (u, v) ∈ S, where
(i, td, S) ← Gch(1κ), then Fch(i, u, v, ·) computes a (deterministic) function
gi,u,v(·) over the domain {0, 1}n whose image has size at most 2n−k.
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4. Chameleon Property: there exists an algorithm CLBch which, on input
the function index i, the trapdoor td and any u ∈ U , computes a unique
v ∈ V to result in a lossy branch (u, v). In formula, v ← CLBch(i, td, u) such
that (u, v) ∈ B∗.
5. Security (1): Indistinguishability between Lossy Branches and In-
jective Branches. It is hard to distinguish a lossy branch from an injective
branch. Any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that receives i as
input, where (i, td, S) ← Gch(1κ), has only a negligible probability of distin-
guishing a pair (u, v0) ∈ S from (u, v1) /∈ S, even u is chosen by A. Formally,
Let A be a CH-LI distinguisher and deﬁne its advantage as
AdvCH-LIA (1
κ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
⎡
⎢⎣β = β′ :
(i, td, S) ← Gch(1κ);u ← A(i);
v0 = CLBch(i, td, u); v1
$← V ;
β
$← {0, 1};β′ ← A(i, u, vβ)
⎤
⎥⎦− 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Given a collection of chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions, it is hard to
distinguish a lossy branch from an injective branch, if AdvCH-LIA (·) is negligible
for every PPT distinguisher A.
6. Security (2): Hidden Lossy Branches. It is hard to ﬁnd one-more lossy
branch. Any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that receives (i, u, v)
as input, where (i, td, S) ← Gch(1κ) and (u, v) $← S, has only a negligible
probability of outputting a pair (u′, v′) ∈ S\{(u, v)}.
In the above deﬁnition, if F−1ch (s, td, u, v, ·) inverts correctly on all values in
the image of gs,u,v(·) with (u, v) /∈ S, and CLBch(s, td, u) outputs v such that
(u, v) ∈ S, both with overwhelming probability, the collection is called almost-
always chameleon ABO-TDFs.
4 General Construction of Chameleon ABO-TDFs
Given a family of ABO-TDFs
(
Gabo,Fabo,F
−1
abo
)
, we show how to transform it
into a family of chameleon ABO-TDFs
(
Gch,Fch,F
−1
ch ,CLBch
)
with the help of a
family of chameleon hash functions
(
HGen, Hk, H
−1
k
)
and possibly a family T of
collision-resistant hash functions. The idea is the integration of the chameleon
hash functions into the ABO-TDFs by replacing each branch of an ABO-TDFs
with the branch’s pre-image in the chameleon hash function. Let Y be the range
of the chameleon hash functions, and B the branch set of the family of ABO-
TDFs. When Y  B we still need a family T of collision-resistant hash functions
to map Y to B.
In the construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs from ABO-TDFs, a family of
chameleon hash functions is needed and their input (u, v) serves as the branches
of the chameleon ABO-TDFs. With the help of a family of chameleon hash
functions H and a family T of collision-resistant hash functions, all (u, v) are
mapped into branches of an ABO-TDF i.e., b = T (Hk(u, v)) ∈ B and Hk ∈
H, T $←− T . The evaluation of the chameleon ABO-TDF behaves exactly as the
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ABO-TDF with b = T (Hk(u, v)) as its branch input. Consequently, the set of
lossy branches of the chameleon ABO-TDF is made up of the pre-images of all
lossy branches of the ABO-TDF, i.e., {(u, v) : T (Hk(u, v)) = b∗, b∗ ∈ B∗}, with
B∗ the set of lossy branches of the ABO-TDFs. The chameleon property of the
chameleon ABO-TDFs inherits from that of chameleon hash functions and the
security of the chameleon ABO-TDFs inherits mainly from the security and the
property of “hidden lossy branches” of the ABO-TDFs.
Construction 1. Let
(
HGen, Hk, H
−1
k
)
describe a family of chameleon hash
functions with Hk : U × V → Y, and
(
Gabo,Fabo,F
−1
abo
)
describe a family of
(n, k)-ABO-TDFs with B the set of branches. Let T describe a family of collision-
resistant hash functions mapping Y to B. Then, a family of (n, k)-chameleon
ABO-TDFs with branch set U × V can be constructed with the following algo-
rithms
(
Gch,Fch,F
−1
ch ,CLBch
)
.
Sampling a function Gch(1κ): Given a security parameter κ ∈ N, T $←− T ,
(k, td1)
$←− Hgen(1κ), u∗ $←− U , v∗ $←− V, compute b∗ = T (Hk(u∗, v∗)).
Sample a function from the ABO-TDFs with (i′, td2,B∗) ← Gabo(1κ, b∗). Let
S = {(u, v) : T (Hk(u, v)) = b∗, b∗ ∈ B∗}. Return i = (i′, Hk, T ) as the
function index, td = (td1, (u∗, v∗), td2) as the trapdoor, and S as the set of
lossy branches.
Evaluation of functions: For all injective branch (u, v), define
Fch(i, u, v, ·) := Fabo(i′, T (Hk(u, v)) , ·).
Then, Fch(i, u, v, ·) computes an injective function if T (Hk(u, v)) /∈ B∗, and
a lossy function if T (Hk(u, v)) ∈ B∗.
Inversion of injective functions: On input a function index i, a branch
(u, v) /∈ S, the trapdoor td = (td1, (u∗, v∗), td2), and z = Fch(i, u, v, x), the
inverse function returns
F−1ch (i, u, v, td, z) := F
−1
abo(i
′, T (Hk(u, v)) , td2, z).
Chameleon property(Computing a lossy branch): On input the trapdoor
td = (td1, (u∗, v∗), td2), andu′
$←− U ,CLBch computesv′ = H−1k (u∗, v∗, td1, u′),
and return (u′, v′). In formula,
CLBch(i, td, u′) := H−1k (u
∗, v∗, td1, u′).
When the range of the chameleon hash functions falls into the branch set of the
ABO-TDFs, i.e, Y ⊆ B, the family T of collision-resistant hash functions can
be omitted in the construction. We now state the security theorem of the above
chameleon ABO-TDFs. The proofs will be given in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 1. The above general construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs satisfies
(1) indistinguishability between lossy branches and injective branches; (2) hidden
lossy branches.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed a black-box construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs,
which can transform any ABO-TDFs into chameleon ABO-TDFs with the
help of chameleon hash functions, and possibly some collision-resistant hash
functions. We can obtain the ﬁrst chameleon ABO-TDFs based on the DDH
assumption by instantiating the construction with the existing ABO-TDFs and
chameleon hash functions. According to [12], these chameleon ABO-TDFs imply
more eﬃcient black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE in the standard model
than that in [18].
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